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THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM AND ITS EFFECT ON 
INTERNAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 19, 2010, the FBI and United Kingdom law 
enforcement orchestrated what is now known as the “Catch 22” sting 
operation.1 Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of the 
Nigerian Defense Ministry, used a confidential informant to conduct a 
false transaction with an individual suspected of bribing the Nigerian 
Ministry in a $15 million arms sale.2 The sting operation yielded solid 
evidence against the suspects, and the FBI subsequently arrested 
twenty-two corporate executives and employees in the military and 
law enforcement-product industry.3  
The Catch 22 sting operation may be the most creative example of 
the recent surge in Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) charges against companies and 
individuals violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19774 
(“FCPA”) and securities laws.5 At the end of 2010, thirty-four 
individuals and companies were awaiting trial on FCPA charges.6  
                                                                                                                 
1 CATCH-22: Lessons from DOJ's Massive Undercover FCPA Sting, MCGUIRE WOODS 
LLP (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4481; see 
also FBI Charges 22 Over Alleged Foreign Bribery, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8469117.stm (last updated Jan. 19, 2010, 8:25 PM) 
(describing an FBI sting operation that resulted in the arrest of 22 individuals suspected of 
bribing the minister of defense of an African country in violation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act). 
2 FBI Charges 22 Over Alleged Foreign Bribery, BBC NEWS, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8469117.stm (last updated Jan. 19, 2010, 8:25 PM). 
3 Id. 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1-78dd-3 (2006). The FCPA generally makes it unlawful for a 
company or people acting on its behalf to “offer . . . promise to give, or authoriz[e] . . . the 
giving of anything of value to” foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd–1(a) (2006). 
5 Since 2008, the number of prosecutions and fines for violations of the FCPA alone have 
increased dramatically. For example, Siemens AG paid $800 million to the SEC and 
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In July 2009, the SEC charged two corporate executives for 
violations of Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B) and 30A 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 
13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder.7 The SEC did not allege that the 
executives had personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the illegal 
conduct, yet the executives consented to have final judgments entered 
against them.8 Each executive paid $25,000.9 Thus, the SEC is 
aggressively pursuing individuals responsible for corporate 
corruption, whether or not those individuals had actual knowledge or 
direct involvement in the violation. On March 18, 2010, the SEC 
Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami stated that “law enforcement 
authorities within the U.S. and across the globe are working together 
to aggressively monitor violators of anti-corruption laws.”10 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
Department of Justice in 2008 for systematically bribing foreign officials of various countries to 
obtain various business opportunities, representing the highest penalty to date. Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available 
at http://sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-294.htm. On February 11, 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root 
LLC (“KBR”) admitted to paying Nigerian officials at least $182 million in bribes in exchange 
for its multinational energy joint venture, T.K.S.J. Nigeria LTD (“TKSJ”) and acquiring 
contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities. Together, KBR and its parent company, 
Halliburton, paid a total of $579 million in fines and disgorged profits. Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Charges KBR and Halliburton for FCPA Violations (Feb. 11, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-23.htm. KBR’s former CEO, Albert Jackson Stanley, 
pled guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA, paid $10.8 million in restitution, and “face[d] 
seven years in prison.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Former CEO of Kellogg, Brown & 
Root, Inc. with Foreign Bribery (Sep. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-189.htm. Many other corporations were involved in 
TSKJ joint ventures to pay bribes to Nigerian government officials, including BAE Systems 
PLC, which paid $400 million in fines for establishing offshore shell companies to receive 
illegal payments, Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, BAE Systems PLC 
Pleads Guilty and Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm-209.html; Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. 
and its Italian parent company ENI S.p.A., which paid $365 million in fines and disgorged 
profits in July 2010, Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Italian Company & Dutch Subsidiary in 
Scheme Bribing Nigerian Officials With Carloads of Cash (July 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-119.htm; Technip S.A., which agreed to pay $338 
million in fines and disgorged profits in June 2010, Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Technip 
with FCPA Violations (June 28, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-
110.htm; and JGC Corporation, which paid $218.8 million in April, 2010, Press Release, Dep’t 
of Justice, JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation & Agrees to 
Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html.  
6 FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/2010.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (listing 
chronological docket information for enforcement actions). 
7 Nature's Sunshine Products, Inc. Litigation Release No. 21162 (July 30, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21162.htm. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Innospec for Illegal Bribes to Iraqi and Indonesian 
Officials (Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-40.htm 
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Department of Justice recently made FCPA enforcement one of its 
highest priorities, leading to a significant increase in prosecutions.11 
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, speaking at the 24th 
National Conference on the FCPA on November 16, 2010, openly 
warned of this crackdown on corruption: “I am aware that, for some 
of you, as we have become more aggressive, you have become more 
worried. . . . I want to tell you this afternoon that you are right to be 
more concerned.”12  
In general, corporations caught engaging in criminal conduct have 
used internal compliance programs that should have prevented their 
criminal activities.13 The sting operation, discribed above, and the 
hundreds of other prosecutions reveal that under the current system, 
internal compliance programs alone cannot be trusted to effectively 
discover and eliminate fraudulent corporate conduct. Rather, internal 
compliance programs seem to require external incentives to ensure 
their effectivness.  
On May 25, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”) adopted final rules to implement the requirements of Section 
922 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”),14 which created a whistleblower reward 
program.15 These rules reward individuals who provide the SEC with 
high-quality tips that lead to successful enforcement actions against 
companies that violate the federal securities laws.16 Whistleblowers 
are eligible for a reward of ten to thirty percent of any monetary 
sanctions resulting from the SEC enforcement action or any related 
                                                                                                                 
 
(internal quotations omitted).  
11 See Gary G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Acting 
Deputy Attorney General Gary G. Grindler Speaks at a World Bank International Meeting. 
(Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2010/dag-speech-
101208.html (“[T]he United States has made combating bribery through the rule of law a top 
priority.”).  
12 Lanny A. Bruer, Assistant Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney 
General Lanny A. Bruer Speaks at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html.  
13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires corporations to file an internal control report 
with their annual and interim reports detailing the establishment and maintenance of internal 
control programs, financial reports and an assessment of their effectiveness. Pub. L. No. 107–
204, 116 Stat. 745 § 404 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 
124 Stat. 1841 (2010). 
15 SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm. 
16 Id. (“The new SEC whistleblower program, implemented under Section 922 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, is primarily intended to reward individuals who act early to expose violations 
and who provide significant evidence that helps the SEC bring successful cases.”).  
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action.17 The bounty program coupled with the unprecedented 
undercover sting operation18 exemplify the SEC’s and DOJ’s 
aggressive stance on prosecuting and collecting fines from violators 
of securities laws. Additionally, the successful extradition of foreign 
nationals to the United States to face FCPA charges19 suggest that the 
whistleblower program will play a key role in further identifying and 
prosecuting violators of the FCPA and securities law.  
But many critics argue that it will do so at a price: the 
whistleblower program may incentivize whistleblowers to report out 
rather than in, thwarting internal compliance programs that have spent 
years building and maintaining.20 Encouraging employees to report 
violations directly to the SEC rather than internally diminishes the 
“culture of compliance and integrity” that is essential to the 
maintenance of effective internal compliance programs.21 This 
argument begs the question: are companies’ current internal 
compliance programs really worth fighting for?  
This Comment argues that the current trend in aggressive FCPA 
and securities law prosecutions coupled with the new whistleblower 
program will likely interfere with already established internal 
compliance programs in the short term, but will encourage more 
robust and effective internal compliance programs in the long run. 
The 2007–10 surge in FCPA charges is a clear example that the SEC 
and DOJ are right not to leave it up to companies’ compliance 
programs to find and report violations of U.S. laws. Rather, company 
employees are in the best position to uncover and prevent these 
                                                                                                                 
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 
922, 124 Stat. 1741, 1842 (2010). 
18 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.  
19 See Howard W. Goldstein & Lisa Bebchick, U.K. Extraditions Facilitate Corruptions 
Prosecutions, N.Y. LAW J., May 6, 2010. 
20 See Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13, 
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 240 & 249) (“The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, enacted on July 21, 2010 (‘Dodd-Frank’), established a whistleblower 
program that requires the Commission to pay an award, under regulations prescribed by the 
Commission and subject to certain limitations, to eligible whistleblowers who voluntarily 
provide the Commission with original information about a violation of the Federal securities 
laws that leads to the successful enforcement of a covered judicial or administrative action, or a 
related action. Dodd-Frank also prohibits retaliation by employers against individuals who 
provide the Commission with information about possible securities violations.”). 
21 Recent Legislation: Corporate Law – Securities Regulations – Congress Expands 
Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1829, 1834 (2011) (citing Letter from Alexander M. Cutler, Chairman and CEO of Eaton Corp., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-142.pdf) (quotation marks omitted); see also 
Ben Protess, Former SEC Chief Says Dodd- Frank Misses Goals, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 
12 2011, 7:26 PM) (“‘This provision threatens to undermine corporate governance, internal 
compliance and the confidence of public investors in our heavily regulated capital markets.’”) 
(quoting Harvey Pitt, former SEC Chief). 
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violations. And as companies face the possibility of harsh penalties 
and more frequent whistleblowing, they may be encouraged to create 
stronger mechanisms for compliance.  
This Comment first examines the whistleblower provisions that 
preceded the SEC’s final rules. It then describes the provisions of the 
SEC regulations on whistleblower bounty and the incentives that the 
rules provide for employees to report out rather than in. Next, this 
Comment addresses the potential negative and positive consequences 
of these incentives to internal compliance programs. It concludes by 
arguing that an aggressive stance on FCPA and securities violations 
will help businesses formulate legal and profitable ways to do 
business and will bolster current internal compliance programs that 
have been ineffective to date.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES  
The United States has enacted a variety of statutes designed to 
encourage employees to blow the whistle on fraudulent conduct.22 
Many of the whistleblower statutes are enacted in response to 
financial scandals. For instance, Congress enacted the Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in reaction to insider trading 
scandals like the Drexel Burnman Lambert, Inc. scandal. Likewise, 
after the Enron and Worldcom debacles, Congress enacted the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.23 The effectiveness of these statutes however 
has varied tremendously. This section discusses the most notable of 
these statutes and compares them to the SEC’s Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower provisions.24  
“[T]he first statutory cause of action protecting whistleblowers 
from employer retaliation” was the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978.25 The Civil Service Reform Act only protected federal 
employees, however,26 and, overall, it “had little impact.”27 Congress 
                                                                                                                 
22 See, e.g., Lucienne M. Hartman, Comment, Whistle While You Work: The Fairytale-
Like Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Emergence of “Greedy,” the 
Eighth Dwarf, 62 MERCER L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2011) (citing Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, 
Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud 
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 111 (2007)) (detailing protections for whistleblowers that 
existed prior to the Dodd-Frank Act).  
23 Dave Ebersole, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions, 6 
OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 123, 125 n.17 (2011) (citation omitted).  
24 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1280–86 (discussing the three notable whistleblower 
statutes prior to the Dodd-Frank Act and comparing them to the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
whistleblower protections). 
25 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 125; see also S. REP. No. 100–413, at 2 (1988) (the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978 “prohibited . . . personnel action against an employee in reprisal for 
a disclosure of government wrongdoing or fraud, i.e., ‘whistleblowing’”). 
26 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 125. 
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later expanded the whistleblower protections by enacting the 
Whistleblower Protections Act of 1989.28 This Act modified prior 
whistleblower protections by establishing a separate agency to litigate 
claims,29 permitting whistleblowers to file claims without government 
support under certain circumstances30 and allowing courts to shift 
attorneys’ fees from whistleblower plaintiffs to defendants.31  
Alternatively, the Securities and Exchange Act of 193432 provided 
a financial reward to whistleblowers. Under the 1934 Act, the SEC 
rewards a whistleblower with up to ten percent of a monetary sanction 
collected from a company for violating insider-trading laws.33 
However, the whistleblower’s reward is not guaranteed: the SEC 
reserves absolute discretion in determining whether to grant an award 
and, if so, its amount.34 Because whistleblowers are unable to rely on 
this statute, and because the award is unsubstantial, the statute is an 
ineffective incentive for potential whistleblowers.35 Thus far, only 
five people have received awards in the twenty years the statute has 
been in effect, totaling a mere $159,537.36 
The False Claims Act,37 however, has been more effective than the 
1934 Exchange Act. Congress enacted the False Claims Act in 1863, 
and has amended it several times38 to produce the government’s 
“primary vehicle . . . for recouping losses suffered through fraud.”39 
The Act provides two ways a whistleblower can receive an award for 
reporting fraud: (1) the Attorney General can bring a civil action 
                                                                                                                 
 
27 Id. The percentage of federal employees reporting known fraud did not change 
following the act’s passage, while an increased number of employees failed to report illegal 
activity. Id. at 125 n.20 (citing S. REP. NO. 100–413, at 2 (1988)). 
28 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989).  
29 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–12, § 1221, 103 Stat. 16, 29 
(1989). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. § 1221(g)(1). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
33 15 U.S.C. § 78u–1(e) (2006). 
34 Id. 
35 See Robert R. Stauffer & Andrew D. Kennedy, Dodd-Frank Act Promises Large 
Bounties for Whistleblowers, LAW.COM (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/article.jsp?id=1202470880915. 
36 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1282–83 (discussing the merits of the whistleblower 
provisions in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). 
37 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
38 The False Claims Act was amended in 1943, 1986, and 2009. Hartman, supra note 22, 
at 1282 (citing Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78–213, 57 Stat. 608 (1943); False Claims 
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–562, 100 Stat. 3153 (1986); Fraud Enforcement and 
Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009)). 
39 Hartman, supra note 22, at 1282 (quoting Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam 
Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False 
Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45, 47 (2004)) (quotation marks omitted). 
 11/15/2011 4:39:00 PM 
2011] THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 339 
against a violator, in which case the whistleblower would receive 15 
to 25 percent of any penalty the government collects from the 
investigation,40 or (2) any individual “may pursue the claim, qui tam, 
if the government chooses not to pursue the claim within sixty days of 
filing the claim.”41 Either way, the False Claims Act guarantees both 
the whistleblower’s award42 and retaliation protection.43 The False 
Claims Act has been successful—“[i]n the 2010 fiscal year,” for 
example, “the Department of Justice recovered $3 billion in False 
Claims Act cases, with whistleblower awards totaling $385 
million.”44  
More recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act45 provides antiretaliation 
protection for whistleblowers who report securities-related 
violations.46 The provisions prohibit employers from taking 
retaliatory action against a whistleblower and entitle victims of 
retaliation to reinstatement, back pay, and legal fees.47 Sarbanes-
Oxley requires that corporations create internal compliance programs 
that “‘provide employees with a standardized channel to report 
organizational misconduct internally within the corporation.’”48  
The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010, amended significant 
portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For instance, it (1) broadened the 
scope of protected disclosures,49 (2) removed the requirement that 
claimants first exhaust all administrative remedies with the 
Department of Labor before bringing an action in federal district 
court,50 and (3) provided more expansive remedies such as granting a 
                                                                                                                 
40 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a)–(d)(1) (2006). 
41 Hartman, supra note 22, at 1283 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2006)). 
42 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
43 Id. § 3730(h). 
44 See Hartman, supra note 22, at 1284 (citing False Claims Act Update & Alert: DoJ 
Recovers $3 Billion in FY 2010 False Claims Act Cases, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD 
EDUCATION FUND (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.taf.org/whistle299.htm.). 
45 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in Titles 15 and 18 of the United States Code). 
46 Id. § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006) (amended 2010)). 
47 Id. (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)–(c) (2006) (amended 2010)). 
48 Hartman, supra note 22, at 1285 (quoting Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond 
Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate and Securities Fraud 
Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 115 (2007)). 
49 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (providing protection for employees who 
disclose information about violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344, and 1348; “any rule or 
regulation of the SEC; or any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders”), 
with Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §922, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1846 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A)) (protecting all 
disclosures protected by Sarbanes-Oxley, and, additionally, any disclosures under the Security 
Exchange Act of 1934, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e), “and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to 
the jurisdiction of the [SEC]”). 
50 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)) (requiring 
that a complaint be filed with the Secretary of Labor before permitting de novo review by a 
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whistleblower who succeeds in a retaliation claim two times the 
amount of back pay including interest in addition to reasonable 
attorneys fees and costs of litigation.51 
In addition, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has been 
supportive of the notion that whistleblower employees are key to 
enforcement and must be protected from retaliation. Jurisprudence on 
whistleblower statutes runs on the “Antiretaliation Principle,”52 which 
recognizes “that employees must be protected from retaliation in 
order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and criminal 
laws.”53 The Supreme Court generally assumes that “employees are in 
the best position to know about illegal conduct by their employer[,] . . 
. employees will report this information if the law protects them from 
employer retaliation[,] . . . [and] employee reports about misconduct 
will improve law enforcement.”54 The Court’s fifty-year 
jurisprudence sends a “clear message: employees play an important 
role in enforcing statutory laws and the Court will provide employees 
broad protection from retaliation in order to enhance enforcement of 
those laws.”55  
Based on the array of statutes available to whistleblowers and the 
Supreme Court’s supportive interpretations, some commentators 
assert that the legal system sufficiently supports whistleblowers.56 
However, as others contend, higher complexity in American financial 
institutions, technology, and communications only increases the need 
for whistleblowers’ reports.57 This Comment asserts that precisely 
                                                                                                                 
 
district court), with Dodd-Frank Act §§ 748, 922 (permitting an antiretaliation civil action to be 
brought directly in federal district court).  
51 Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 806(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2)) 
(authorizing relief for an individual prevailing in an antiretaliation action to include 
reinstatement with the same seniority status, back pay with interest, and compensation for 
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees), with Dodd-Frank Act § 922 
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u–6(h)(1)(C)) (providing for double back pay with interest in 
addition to reinstatement and compensation for litigation costs and fees). 
52 The “‘Antiretaliation Principle’ allows the [Supreme] Court to examine antiretaliation 
protection as a law-enforcement tool that benefits society, rather than simply as extra protection 
for employees provided at a cost to employers.” Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s 
Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 380 (2010). 
53 Id.  
54 Id at 380–81. The Court even interpreted explicit antiretaliation provisions in statutes 
that contained no specific provision granting such rights. Id. at 383 (discussing the Court’s 
treatment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (1958), as interpreted 
in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960)).  
55 Id. at 392.  
56 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 126 (“[W]histleblowers enjoyed a broad array of federal 
protection to incentivize securities fraud reporting prior to Dodd-Frank.”). 
57 Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39 HOUS. L. 
REV. 905, 917 (2002) (discussing the increased need for “private justice” in modern society and 
the necessity of fostering private justice by encouraging whistleblower reporting).  
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because of these complexities public regulation, now more than ever, 
needs inside sources that can provide information typically “hidden 
from public view.”58  
II. THE SEC FINAL RULES  
On July 21, 2010, in response to the financial crisis that began in 
2008,59 President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,60 which governs a wide variety 
of financial institutions ranging from credit card companies61 to 
mortgage lenders.62 One provision in particular is under scrutiny for 
its potential effect on internal compliance programs.63 Section 922 of 
the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 
193464 by adding section 21F, “Securities Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protection.”65 This section expanded the incentives for employees 
to blow the whistle by (1) requiring the SEC to provide substantial 
bounties to whistleblowers who provide useful information to the 
SEC regarding securities law violations,66 and (2) providing enhanced 
retaliation protections where the whistleblower can receive stronger 
protection if he or she reports directly to the SEC but weaker 
                                                                                                                 
58 Id. at 916. 
59 Times Topics: Financial Regulatory Reform, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit_crisis/financial_regulato
ry_reform/index.html (last updated Sept. 20, 2011).  
60 Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the 
United States Code). The Dodd-Frank Act addresses a number of key issues including (1) 
consolidating regulatory agencies and establishing committees to oversee specific high risk 
institutions; (2) highly regulating financial markets, especially highly risky transactions; (3) 
instituting consumer protection reforms; and (4) addressing the necessary institutional 
mechanisms such as “FDIC authority to allow for the orderly winding down of bankrupt firms, 
and a proposal that the Federal Reserve receive from the U.S. Treasury Department extensions 
of credit in exigent circumstances.” Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act’s Robust 
Whistleblowing Incentives, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2011, 9:20 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2011/04/14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robust-
whistleblowing-incentives/. 
61 See Dodd-Frank Act § 920 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1693o–2) (imposing various 
limitations on “payment card networks,” including credit card networks). 
62 See id. §§ 1400–98 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.) 
(designating Title XIV of Dodd-Frank as the “Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending 
Act” and imposing regulations on the mortgage industry).  
63 See, e.g., supra note 21, 1831–32 (2011) (noting that, as a potential drafting error, 
Dodd-Frank affords antiretaliatory protection only to employees who report externally); Nathan 
Koppel, Dodd-Frank Detractors May Be Headed to a Courthouse Near You, WALL ST. J. LAW 
BLOG (July 29, 2011, 10:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/07/29/dodd-frank-detractors-
may-be-headed-to-a-courthouse-near-you/ (commenting on the “litigation storm clouds” 
surrounding Dodd-Frank, including the whistleblower provision). 
64 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a–78pp (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).  
65 Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6).  
66 Id.  
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protections if he or she reports to the company via the internal 
compliance programs.67  
The SEC’s final rules were adopted to implement the Dodd-Frank 
Act requirements. The rules define a “whistleblower” as an 
individual, not a company or entity, who provides the SEC with 
information that relates to a “possible violation” of federal securities 
laws, the FCPA, or commodities laws that has occurred, is ongoing, 
or is about to occur.68 The whistleblower may remain anonymous 
when reporting possible violations, but, to do so, must report through 
an attorney.69 If whistleblowers provide information before a request, 
inquiry, or demand is directed to the whistleblower personally by the 
SEC or other government authorities, the whistleblower’s report is 
considered “voluntary.”70 However, a submission will not be 
considered voluntary if the whistleblower has a preexisting legal duty 
to report such information to the SEC arising from a contract with the 
SEC or another law enforcement agency, or arising under any judicial 
or administrative order.71  
A whistleblower is eligible for an award only if the incriminating 
information is (1) based upon the whistleblower’s independent 
knowledge or analysis not already known to the SEC, (2) not 
exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or 
administrative hearing, government report, or the news media, unless 
the whistleblower is the source of that information, and (3) first 
provided to the SEC on or after July 21, 2010.72 The whistleblower 
will only receive an award if the information is “sufficiently specific, 
credible and timely to cause” the commencement or reopening of an 
investigation resulting in successful enforcement action.73 If the 
reported violation was already under investigation, the SEC will 
consider whether the new information “significantly contributed” to 
the success of the action.74 While certain exclusions apply,75 the 
whistleblower will receive an award that is “at least 10 [percent] and 
no more than 30 [percent] of the total monetary sanctions” collected 
in successful actions.76  
                                                                                                                 
67 Id.  
68 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,363 (June 
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–2(a)). 
69 Id. at 34,367 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–7).  
70 Id. at 34,364 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)). 
71 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(a)(3)).  
72 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(1)). 
73 Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(1)). 
74 Id. (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(c)(2)).  
75 Id. at 34,364–65 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(4)(i)–(vi)).  
76 Id. at 34,366 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–5).  
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The final rules incorporated by reference the provisions of the 
Exchange Act that protect individuals who report information to the 
SEC with a reasonable belief77 that such information relates to a 
possible securities violation, regardless of whether the individual 
satisfies the requirements to receive an award.78 A whistleblower has 
antiretaliation protection if he reports information in a manner 
described in section 21F(h)(1)(A). Thus, the rules provide incentives 
for whistleblowers to report violations either internally or externally.  
III. INCENTIVES TO REPORT INTERNALLY  
The final rules incentivize, but do not require, a whistleblower to 
report first through his or her company’s internal compliance 
program. The rules provide three primary incentives. First, 
whistleblowers can obtain the same award when they report through 
their companies’ internal compliance programs and the company 
informs the SEC of the violation.79 If the company does not have an 
internal compliance program, reporting to legal counsel, senior 
management, or a director still renders the whistleblower eligible for 
the reward.80 Second, the final rules provide that a whistleblower’s 
voluntary participation in a company’s internal compliance program 
is a factor that can increase the amount of an award while interference 
with such a program is a factor that has the reverse effect.81 Third, the 
rules create a 120-day “look-back” period, under which an individual 
can qualify for an award if he or she first reported the possible 
violations to the company under the company’s internal compliance 
                                                                                                                 
77 To satisfy the reasonable belief requirement, the individual must “hold a subjectively 
genuine belief that the information demonstrates a possible violation, and that the belief is one 
that a similarly situated employee might reasonably possess.” Id. at 34,303. This approach is 
consistent with the approach followed by various courts that have construed the antiretaliation 
provisions of other federal statutes, including the False Claims Act. See, e.g., Parker v. Balt. & 
Ohio R.R., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that, in a Title VII retaliation case, 
“[t]he employer is sufficiently protected against malicious accusations and frivolous claims by a 
requirement that an employee seeking the protection of the opposition clause demonstrate a 
good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged practice violates Title VII”); Hindsman v. Delta 
Airlines, Admin. Rev. Bd. Case No. 09–023 at 5 (Dep’t of Labor June 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ARB/DECISIONS/ARB_DECISIONS/AIR/09_023.AIRP.PDF 
(interpreting the antiretaliation provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and 
Reform Act, which explicitly excludes frivolous complaints and those brought in bad faith, as 
requiring a “reasonable belief” by the whistleblower that the violation of the statute has 
occurred).  
78 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,363 (June 
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–2(b)(1)).  
79 Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R 240.21F–4(c)(3)). 
80 Id. at 34,325 n.224 (suggesting that, because of the need for proof that the 
whistleblower provided original information, employees in this situation “generate, obtain and 
retain” appropriate documentation). 
81 Id. at 34,366–67 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–6).  
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program, and then submitted the same information to the SEC within 
120 days.82   
The rules’ effect on internal compliance programs was a 
significant issue commentators discussed in the rules’ Proposing 
Release.83 Comments were sharply divided between supporting a 
requirement for internal reporting and opposing such a requirement. 
Supporters note that internal reporting would allow companies to take 
appropriate actions to remedy improper conduct earlier,84 allow 
companies to self-report,85 avoid undermining internal compliance 
programs that companies have designed to deter, identify and correct 
violations,86 preserve the SEC’s scant resources87 and promote 
working relationships between the SEC and the companies,88 among 
others. Requiring internal reporting to the opposing side meant 
“prohibit[ing] whistleblowers from reporting fraud directly and 
immediately to the [SEC],”89 “creat[ing] unnecessary and improper 
hurdles for whistleblowers,”90 “result[ing] in whistleblowers deciding 
not to report misconduct”91 (perhaps because of a “risk of 
                                                                                                                 
82 Id. at 34,365 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F–4(b)(7)).  
83 Id. at 34,300.  
84 Id. at 34,325 (citing Letter from Chamber of Commerce et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC, (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-
110.pdf).  
85 Id. at 34,324 (citing letter from Gary M. Brown, Baker, Donaldson, Bearman, 
Caldewell & Berkowitz PC, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-140.pdf).  
86 Id. (citing Letter from Gary M. Brown, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & 
Berkowitz, PC, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-140.pdf; E-mail from Americans for Ltd. Gov’t 
et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-110.pdf; Letter from Michelle Davies, Acting 
Gen. Counsel, Foster Wheeler AG, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 13, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-111.pdf; E-mail from Apache Corp. et al., to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
33-10/s73310-150.pdf; Letter from Donna Dabney, Vice President, Sec’y, & Corp. Gen. 
Counsel, Alcoa Inc. et al., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-182.pdf; E-mail from Allstate Ins. Co. et al., to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
33-10/s73310-189.pdf. 
87 Id. (citing E-mail from Americans for Ltd. Gov’t, supra note 86).  
88 Id. 
89 Id. (citing Letter from Stephen M. Kohn, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Whistleblowers Ctr., to Mary 
L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (May17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-314.pdf).  
90 Id. (citing Letter from Cleveland Lawrence, III, Acting Exeucitve Director, Taxpayers 
Against Fraud, to Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-228.pdf).  
91 Id. (citing E-mail from Julie Grohovsky, Wu, Grohovsky & Whipple et al, to Elizabeth 
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-
10/s73310-136.pdf; E-mail from Danielle Brian, Exec. Dir., Project on Gov’t Oversight, to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
33-10/s73310-163.pdf).  
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retaliation”92), and “eliminat[ing] incentives for companies to 
improve their internal compliance programs.”93 The SEC decided it 
would not require mandatory internal reporting, noting that, while 
important, internal compliance programs are “not substitutes for 
rigorous law enforcement.”94  
The SEC commented that the objective of these provisions, 
namely the “look-back” provision, was to support, not undermine, the 
effective functioning of company compliance and related systems by 
allowing employees to take their concerns to the company officials, 
and simultaneously preserving their rights under the Commission’s 
whistleblower program.95 Internal compliance programs are “essential 
sources of information for companies about misconduct.”96 However, 
these provisions seek to “strike a balance” between relying on internal 
programs and receiving the best information possible in reports.97 
Although some companies may have “well-documented, thorough, 
and robust” compliance programs, others do not.98 Leaving it up to 
the whistleblower to assess whether to report potential securities 
violations internal or externally is therefore well supported. 
IV. INCENTIVES TO REPORT EXTERNALLY 
Despite its three incentives for using internal compliance 
procedures, the Dodd-Frank Act has been criticized as setting 
employees against their companies by primarily encouraging external 
reporting. Critics focused on a “two-tiered” structure of protections 
that benefits whistleblowers who report externally versus internally.99 
The SEC’s whistleblower rules provide greater antiretaliation 
protections than the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which was “the first 
comprehensive statute of national scope” that provided protections to 
corporate whistleblowers.100 For reported information and employees 
not covered by Sarbanes-Oxley,101 employees can receive Dodd-
                                                                                                                 
92 Id. (citing Letter from Cleveland Lawrence III, supra note 90; Letter from Julie 
Grohovsky, supra note 91; Letter from Danielle Brian, supra note 91). 
93 Id. (citing Letter from Danielle Brian, supra note 91).  
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 34, 323. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 34, 317 n.154. 
98 Id. at 34, 323. 
99 See Recent Legislation, supra note 21, at 1834. 
100 Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate 
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2005). 
101 Sarbanes-Oxley provides protection for information the whistleblower believes 
constitutes a violation of any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission or 
any provision of federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 § 806(a)(1) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
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Frank protections by reporting externally, but they receive no 
protection if they report internally.102 If the reported information or 
the employee is covered by Sarbanes-Oxley, the employee will 
receive Dodd-Frank protections by reporting externally, but will 
receive only the weaker Sarbanes-Oxley protection by reporting 
internally.103  
Other commentators are concerned that Dodd-Frank protects 
whistleblowers without requiring the whistleblower to hold a 
“reasonable belief” that a breach of securities law occurred.104 The 
SEC addressed some of these concerns in the final rules by 
implementing the “reasonable belief” requirement while at the same 
time retaining the two-tiered system that distinguishes between 
internal and external reporters. The rules also addressed concerns that 
employees are encouraged to report out, rather than in, by providing 
whistleblowers the same bounty for reporting internally under certain 
circumstances.105 However, it is doubtful whether the law’s retaliation 
policy actually influences a whistleblower’s decision to report.  
V. THE FINAL RULES’ EFFECT ON INTERNAL COMPLIANCE 
PROGRAMS 
The final rules are indeed likely to increase whistleblower reports, 
but they are also likely to prompt companies “to run to the SEC 
before one of its employees gets there first.”106 Former SEC 
enforcement attorney Paul Huey-Burns thinks the “thumb is on the 
scale on the side of self-reporting”107 and companies will, now more 
than ever, hire lawyers and forensic accountants to strengthen their 
compliance systems to prevent future violations. Critics worry that 
the rules pit the companies’ Chief Compliance Officers against the 
employees, rather than encourage them to work together.108 The 
common complaint is that internal compliance programs that have 
                                                                                                                 
 
and 18 U.S.C.). 
102 See Recent Legislation, supra note 21, at 1834. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1833 (citing Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1841–42, 1845 (2010) (describing what constitutes “original information” and discussing the 
prohibition on retaliations against employees who provide “original information.”). 
105 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text (discussing potential awards for 
whistleblowers who report matters internally). 
106 Daniel Fisher, SEC Whistleblower Rule Means More Work for Lawyers, FORBES (May 
26, 2011, 3:33 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2011/05/26/sec-whistleblower-rule-
means-more-work-for-lawyers/. 
107 Id. (quotations omitted).  
108 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 137 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act undermines the 
effective internal compliance programs which more adequately address securities violations).  
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taken years to build will be pushed to the wayside as whistleblowers 
greedily seek their bounty. Critics claim that, because companies 
investigate 75 percent of internal reports and that 40 percent of 
internal investigations led to company action in 2009, the internal 
compliance programs are sufficient to capture corporate legal 
violations.109 
The real concern of companies may be quite different than the one 
expressed. Companies may not be as worried about the new rules 
foiling their internal compliance programs as they are concerned 
about the cost of complying with securities laws. The ingredients for 
a sound internal compliance program are no longer limited to simply 
providing a forum where whistleblowers may report violations. 
Rather, companies now have to cultivate a trustworthy and reliable 
program that promises not to retaliate or ignore whistleblowers’ 
complaints. Companies are worried that investing in attorneys and 
forensics accountants will rack up expenses on their already tight 
budgets.110 But these resisting companies may be ignoring the 
importance of effective internal compliance programs and what it can 
do for their bottom line.  
The final rules seem to already be achieving their goal of 
promoting stronger internal compliance programs. Companies are 
beginning to support the internal compliance programs by providing 
employees with incentives to use the programs, including provisions 
in employee contracts that require internal complaints, and may even 
offer their own bounties to compete with the SEC.111 Even the critics 
acknowledge that the Dodd-Frank Act provisions “may require 
management training to avoid whistleblower retaliation, and all 
businesses may need new policies to encourage internal reporting.”112 
While Sarbanes-Oxley requires all public companies to have 
whistleblower mechanisms in place, the old mechanisms have not 
proved effective.113 In fact, an empirical study of the False Claims 
Act, which requires no mandatory internal reporting, stated that “the 
overwhelming majority of employees voluntarily utilized internal 
reporting processes, despite the fact that they were potentially eligible 
for a large reward under the [Act].”114 One study found that the SEC 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. (citation omitted). 
110 Id. at 139 n.138.  
111 Emily Chasan, CFO Report: Companies Adjust to Looming Whistleblower Rule, WALL 
ST. JOURNAL (July 29, 2011, 3:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2011/07/29/companies-adjust-
to-looming-whistleblower-rule/?KEYWORDS=whistleblower+sec+final+rules. 
112 Ebersole, supra note 23, at 139. 
113 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).  
114 Impact of Qui Tam Laws on Internal Compliance: A Report to the SEC, NAT’L 
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is more likely to sanction companies who are proactive about self-
reporting, but also more likely to issue a lower penalty.115  
The risks associated with ineffective and uneforcemeable fraud 
and corruption regulations are far worse to society than the expenses a 
company may incur to bolster their internal compliance systems. 
What if the Enron debacle was avoided by insiders revealing their 
concerns to public regulators? The company may not have gone from 
the seventh largest American company to the largest bankruptcy in 
American history; its stocks may not have plunged from $86 per share 
to $0.27 per share; and it may not have ended up with $13.12 billion 
in debt.116 The few whistleblowers that did report Enron’s 
wrongdoing did so only internally, through mechanisms many argue 
are effective and should be preserved.117  
Moreover, the recent surge in FCPA prosecutions, described 
above, uncovers yet another failing of internal compliance 
programs.118 Such corruption “‘erode[s] society from the inside.’”119 
Illegal economic activity in America costs hundreds of billions of 
dollars and negatively impacts lower and middle class Americans 
disproportionately.120 Corruption and fraud have important social 
costs too: weakened respect for the law and unstable political and 
financial institutions.121  
The United States government recognizes what companies choose 
to ignore: employees are essential sources of information. A 2008 
                                                                                                                 
 
WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., AT 4 (2010), 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfi
nal.pdf. The study found that 89.7 percent of employees who eventually filed False Claims Act 
cases had made an internal report, despite the absence of a legal requirement to do so. Id. The 
False Claims Act, however, does contain higher barriers to participation than does the 
Whistleblower program, such as the requirement of filing a federal court complaint alleging 
fraud with specificity as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the 
Whistleblower program only requires whistleblowers to fill out a Form TCR sworn under 
penalty of perjury. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 
34,327 n.232 (June 13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249). 
115 Rebecca Files, SEC Enforcement: Does Forthright Disclosure and Cooperation Really 
Matter? (Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1640064. 
116 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 942 (citations omitted).  
117 Id. at 943 (citations omitted). 
118 See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the different requirements for 
filing claims under the False Claims Act and the Whistleblower program).  
119 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 929 (quoting EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION XIII (1983) (citation and quotation omitted)). 
120 See STEPHEN M. ROSOFF ET AL., PROFIT WITHOUT HONOR: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 
AND THE LOOTING OF AMERICA 28 (2010) (discussing how personal frauds and antitrust 
violations could cost Americans approximately $250 billion dollars a year.).  
121 See Bucy, supra note 57, at 934–40 (detailing the social harms that can occur as a result 
of economic corruption and crimes).  
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study by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners examined 959 
cases of fraud in United States companies found that forty-six percent 
of instances of fraud were uncovered by whistleblowers, more than 
those found by audits or internal controls.122 Employees only reported 
outside when their complaints were ignored, or when they were 
punished for speaking up. A 2010 National Whistleblowers Center 
study found that approximately ninety percent of employees who filed 
False Claims Act lawsuits initially reported violations internally to 
their supervisors or compliance officers.123 Rather than using the 
valuable information to promote compliance through an effective 
internal compliance program, companies are instead punishing their 
loyal employees124 and causing them to report elsewhere, where their 
valuable information will be appreciated. If the companies continue to 
undervalue whistleblower information, whistleblowers will indeed 
turn outside of the company to make their reports.  
Fortunately, the SEC explicitly leaves it up to the whistleblower to 
decide the most appropriate forum for reporting.125 Complex 
economic wrongdoing, such as securities and FCPA violations, 
require those who are intimately familiar with it for proper detection 
and deterrence.126 Congress and the Supreme Court consistently 
provide whistleblowers with rewards and protections because, as 
government officials have stated, “whistleblowers are essential to our 
operation. Without them, we wouldn’t have cases.”127 
CONCLUSION 
The spike in FCPA and securities law prosecutions combined with 
the new whistleblower program has instilled fear in the corporate 
world that the result of the trend for enforcement will only be costly 
                                                                                                                 
122 2008 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud & Abuse, ASSOC. OF CERTIFIED 
FRAUD EXAM’RS, at 18 (2008), http://www.acfe.com/documents/2008-rttn.pdf.  
123 NAT’L WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR., IMPACT OF QUI TAM LAWS ON INTERNAL 
COMPLIANCE: A REPORT TO THE SEC 4 (2010) available at 
http://www.whistleblowers.org/storage/whistleblowers/documents/DoddFrank/nwcreporttosecfi
nal.pdf.  
124 See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN. 
2213, 2216 (2010) (discussing how a 2007 study by the nonpartisan National Bureau of 
Economic Research found that in eighty-two percent of cases where whistleblower’ identities 
were revealed, the employees were fired, quit under duress, or lost significant job 
responsibilities.).  
125 Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300, 34,323 (June 
13, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249) (“Ultimately, we believe that 
whistleblowers are in the best position to assess whether reporting potential securities violations 
through their companies’ internal compliance and reporting systems would be effective.”). 
126 Bucy, supra note 57, at 940 (noting that “[c]omplex economic activity usually is buried 
in paper trails and electronic messages and hidden within an organization.”). 
127 Id. at 941 (citations and quotations omitted).  
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for the companies and for the market as a whole. However, the 
numerous studies and the even greater number of recently prosecuted 
violations indicate that the problem is not the whistleblower; it is the 
companies’ own failed internal compliance programs. Each 
corporation that the SEC and DOJ prosecuted had its own internal 
compliance programs and each of those programs failed to prevent 
and uncover violations. Those cases evidence the shortcomings of the 
internal compliance programs and stress the need for incentives to 
encourage companies to make appropriate changes. While the DOJ 
and SEC will continue to aggressively prosecute violations, the 
whistleblower program encourages companies to provide an internal 
resource that will render the SEC’s whistleblower program futile. 
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